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There are only slight suggestions of the possibility of a less sympathetic attitude toward the adopted child. In Lanfermam v. Vanffe
three judges in a strong dissent declared that "kindred" means "relatives by blood" and that "the courts should depart from this elemental
blood-guideship only when enforced to do so by an inexorable statutory
demand." There is a trace of this idea of blood-relationship as the
basis of all inheritance laws in an earlier case.Since most of the dicta in the Kentucky cases indicate a sympathy
for the view of the majority of jurisdictions, it seems almost certain
that when this question is decided, Kentucky will be found in agreement with the weight of authority. It is submited that desirable social
results are to be gained in following the majority rule. The adult
by adopting the child takes upon himself the responsibility of caring
for the child and giving him an equal start in life with other children.
In order to fulfill the apparent intention of the adult in adopting the
child, it is necessary to permit the child to inherit from the adult, and
he should not be prevented from inheriting through the negligence or
JAMEs D. ALLEN
oversight of the adult.
Jo M. FEnGuso
HUSBAND AND WIFE-DIVORCE-ASSIGNABILITY OF ALIMONY
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the assignability of alimony
when the assignment is for (1) a future installment, (2) assignment
of a gross award, and (3) an assignment of an installment which has
already accrued and is past due.
Before entering into a discussion of the question we shall consider
the nature and purposes of alimony, the various things to be taken
into consideration by the courts in making the award, and also the
interests of the parties and the public in relation thereto.
Alimony is considered as being an allowance which a husband, by
order of the court, pays to his wife, living separate from him, for her
maintenance.' The amount to be awarded for alimony depends upon a
2
great variety of considerations and is governed by no fixed rules. The
ability of the husband to pay;' the needs of the wife; the acquisition
4
of the estate; whether there are children to be supported and educated,
"150 Ky. 751, 150 S. W. 1008, 1011 (1912).
2Merritt v. Morton Admx., 143 Ky. 133, 136 S. W. 133 (1911).
"See note 11, supra.
'Chase v. Chase, 55 Me. 21 (1869); Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286
(1867). - Richmond v. Richmond, 2 N. J. Eq. 90 (1838); Ricketts v. Ricketts,
4 Gill 105 (Md. 1846); Burr v. Burr, 7 Hill 207 (N. Y., 1843); McGee
v. McGee, 10 Ga. 477 (1851).
3Small v. Small, 28 Neb. 843, 45 N. W. 248 (1880); Battey v. Battey,
1 R. I. 212 (1845); Bursler v. Bursler, 5 Pick. 427 (Mass., 1827); McCrocklin v. McCrocklin, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 370 (1842); McGrady v.
McGrady, 48 Mo. App. 668 (1892).
4Fishli
v. Fishli, Ky. (2 Litt.) 327 (1822); Robbins v. Robbins,
101 Ill. 416 (1882); Stevens v. Stevens, 49 Mich. 504, 13 N. W. 835
(1882).
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and upon whom their support devolves;t the condition in life, place of
residence, health, and employment of the husband, as demanding a
larger or smaller sum for his own support; the condition in life, circumstances, health, place of residence, and consequent necessary
expenditures of the wife;0 the age of the parties,' and whatever other
circumstances may address themselves to a sound judicial discretion of
the court.
The most important of these matters to be considered by the
courts in making the award are the rights of the parties. Since the
courts have the power to change and alter the amount to be paid by
the husband in the future, depending on his ability to pay and the
needs of the wife, it is thought that if the wife is free to assign the
amount which the court has awarded for a much smaller sum that it
will be necessary for the court to increase the award in the future to
enable her to proper support, esepecially if the award which has been
made is barely enough to meet this need. It is also thought that the
wife should be protected against poor investments and other financial
hazards. Most important of all are the interests of the children.
Naturally, part of the award is for their support and education and
since the public is interested in having them become useful and
valuable citizens, their interests should be protected above all others.
Generally, if not universally, installments of alimony which are to
become due and payable in the future are non-assignable.8 Some of
the reasons advanced by the courts for holding that future installments
are not assignable are (1) "that they are against public policy because
the decree is personal, for the support of the wife and children, and to
prevent them from becoming a burden or charge on the public'19 and
(2) "because the courts, either inherently or by statute, have the
power to 'change, alter, or modify' the provisions of a divorce decree in
respect of future installments of alimony"." Decrees for future installL Foss v. Foss, 100 Ill. 576
(1881); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 3 Paige
266 (N. Y., 1832); Call v. Call, 65 Me. 407 (1886); Halleman v. Halleman, 65 Ga. 476 (1880); McGee v. McGee, 10 Ga. 477 (1851).
'Bursler v. Bursler, 5 Pick. 427 (Mass., 1827); Ricketts v. Ricketts,
4 Gill 105 (Md., 1846).
Schlosser v. Schlosser, 29 Ind. 488 (1868); Miller v. Miller, 6
Johns. 91 (N. Y., 1822); Ricketts, 4 Gill 105 (Md., 1846).
"In re Robinson, L. R. 27 Ch. D. 160 (1884); Lynde v. Lynde, 64
N. J. Eq. 736, 52 Atl. 694 (1902); Kempster v. Evans, 81 Wis. 247, 51
N. W. 327 (1892); Newman v. Frietas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1900);
Jordon v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N. W. 826 (1886); McConnell v.
McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S. W. 931 (1911); Welles v. Brown, 226
Mich. 657, 198 N. W. 180 (1924); In re Brackett, 114 App. Div. 257, 99
N. Y. S. 802 (1906) aff'd 198 N. Y. 502, 81 N. E. 1160 (1907).
9Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N. J. Eq. 736, 52 Atl. 694 (1902); Fournier v.
Clutton, 146 Mich. 298, 109 N. W. 425 (1906); Ferguson v. Ferguson,
145 Mich. 290, 108 N. W. 682 (1906).
"Hartigan v. Hartigan, 142 Minn. 274, 171 N. W. 925 (1919);
Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Ore. 477, 67 Pac. 508 (1902); Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla.
1081, 111 So. 382 (1926); Gallant v. Gallant, 154 Miss. 832, 123 So. 88&
(1929); Skinner v. Skinner, 205 Mich. 243, 171 N. W. 383 (1919).
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ments do not create a vested right in the wife but are only to secure
the maintenance of the wife and to permit her to exercise the right to
assign, would frustrate the purpose of the law, therefore such installn
ments cannot be enjoyed by the wife in anticipationY In reaching this
conclusion, the decrees of the courts, the parties themselves, and the
interests of the public in general are all protected and it is a well
established and sound principle of law.
If the award is made for a gross or lump sum, in full for all claims
of alimony or any other account against the husband, the view has
been taken that the wife may make an assignment thereof." It should
be noted at the present time that there are some jurisdictions which do
not permit an assignment under any circumstances or conditions, therefore, the above rule as to assignments when the award is payable in a
gross or lump sum would not hold true in those jurisdictions. In these'
cases the major consideration .has been the general property settlement
under the decree terminating the marital status, and the maintenance
of the wife in the future was a minor consideration. It seems that the
wife should be permitted to control and invest her part of the settlement
in any manner that she deems advisable and the fact that she has been
married and divorced should not be a sufficient reason for subjecting her
property to continual supervision by the court or provide a reason for
placing restrictions thereon. Shouldn't she be just as capable and efficient in the management of her estate as another member of her sex of
equal age and education?
There is a divergence of opinion in the several states as to the
power of the courts to modify provisions of a divorce decree as respects
past-due installments of alimony and the validity of assignments
thereof.? Also, the problem becomes more complex and difficult of solution. However, the general rule is that past-due installments of alimony
4
The main reason advanced by the courts is that
are assignable.
"installments of alimony become vested when they become due and
payable and the court has no power to modify the decree as to them".?
"Greenburg v. Greenburg, 99 N. J. Eq. 461, 133 Atl. 768 (1926);
Fournier v. Clutton, 146 Mich. 657, 198 N. W. 180 (1924).
uBassett v. Waters, 103 Kan. 853, 176 Pac. 663 (1918); Contra:
Welles v. Brown, 226 Mich. 657, 198 N. W. 180 (1924).
3 Harman v. Harman, 196 S. E. 361 (W. Va., 1938); Cederburg v.
Gunstrom, 193 Minn. 421, 258 N. W. 574 (1935); Proctor v. Churchin,
273 N. Y. S. 821, 153 Misc. 121 (1934); Lynham v. Hufty, 44 App. D. C.
589 (1916); Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (1906). Contra:
Greensburg v. Greenburg, 99 N. J.Eq. 461, 133 Atl. 768 (1926); Fournier
v. Clutton, 146 Mich. 298, 109 N. W. 425 (1906); Jordan v. Westerman,
62 Mich. 170, 28 N. W. 826 (1886); Madden, Domestic Relations (1931)
328, n. 62.
"Harman v. Harman, 196 S. E. 361 (W. Va., 1938); Cederburg v.
Cederburg, 193 Minn. 421, 258 N. W. 574 (1935); Proctor v. Curchin,
273 N. Y. S. 821, 153 Misc. 121 (1934); Lynham v. Hufty, 44 App. D. C.
589 (1916); Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (1906).
'5 Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929);
Caples v. Caples, 47 Fed. (2d) 225 (1931); McGregor v. McGregor, 52
Colo. 292, 122 Pac. 390 (1912); Comana v. Maron, 37 Idaho 382, 217
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In other words, it is a property right which has become vested in the
wife because the judgment of the court became final when the installment became due and payable, and like other judgments, is an asset
in the hands of the wife that can be freely assigned. After all, alimony
is for the 2,iaintenance of the wife and she should be entitled to make
an assignment of past-due installments for maintenance which has been
furnished or provided.
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of the
State of West Virginia, the court stated, "when installments of alimony
accrue, the power of the court to alter, control, or cancel them terminates (no fraud appearing), and the right of the payee becomes
0
vested. Such a vested right may be assigned".' An examination of the
cases in the jurisdictions following the majority rule will disclose that
17
installments "due and payable" become a "vested right" or a "vested
0
"
property right", and are freely assignable, especially when the decree
is for the benefit of the wife alone, but should the same rule apply when
the wife is awarded the custody of the children and part of the alimony
decreed by the court is for the support and maintenance of such children? None of the cases show that the court has been confronted with
this exact problem for determination but it is submitted that the
interests of the children should be protected and the wife should not be
permitted to make an assignment of that portion of the award to which
they are entitled. However, if the award is made to the wife for her
exclusive use and benefit under the decree terminating the marriage
relationship, it is submitted that there are no valid reasons for refusing
to permit her to make assignments of the installments which have
accrued and become due and payable. To support this view it would
be necessary to take into consideration the difference in the amount
realized by the assignment and the amount of the installment in an
action by either party for the purpose of changing or altering the
amount of installments to be paid in the future, but this would only
Pac. 597 (1923); Caffrey v. Caffrey, 4 Fed. (2d) 952 (1925); Roberts v.
Roberts, 174 Ga. 645, 163 S. E. 735 (1932); Craig v. Craig, 163 Ill. 176, 45
N. E. 153 (1896); Delbridge v. Sears, 179 Iowa 526, 160 N. W. 218
(1916); Kell v. Kell, 179 Iowa 647, 161 N. W. 634 (1917); Armstrong
v. Armstrong, 117 Oh. St. 558, 160 N. E. 34 (1927); Nelson v. Nelson,
282 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1066 (1920); Campbell v. Campbell, 28 Okla.
838, 115 Pac. 1111 (1911); Phillips v. Kepler, 47 App. D. C. 384 (1918);
Harris v. Harris, 259 N. Y. 334, 182 N. E. 7 (1932); Parkinson v. Parkinson, 222 App. Div. 833, 226 N. Y. S. 454 (1928); Procter v. Churchin,
273 N. Y. S. 821, 153 Misc. 121 (1934); Gilbert v. Hayward, 37 R. I.
303, 92 Atl. 625 (1914); Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 Pac. 123 (1923);
Harris v. Harris, 71 Wash. 307, 128 Pac. 673 (1912); Beers v. Beers,
74 Wash. 458, 133 Pac. 605 (1913); Phillips v. Phillips, 165 Wash. 616,
6 Pac. (2d) 61 (1931); Cotter v. Cotter, 225 Fed. 471 (1915); Rinkenberger v. Rinkenberger, 99 Cal. App. 45, 277 Pac. 1096 (1929).
"Harman v. Harman, 196 S. E. 361 (W. Va., 1938).
17 Supra, n. 15.
'Supra, n. 15.
1' Supra, n. 14.
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constitute one of the many matters to be considered by the court In
determining whether the amount which is to be paid in the future
should be changed.
In a few jurisdictions the courts have held that installments of
alimony which are past-due and payable are not assignable.Y In these
jurisdictions "a wife's claim for alimony is considered as a purely personal right, and not in any sense a property right-a right in its nature
not susceptible of either assignment or enjoyment by her in anticipation",- and "the court has full control of the subject of alimony after a
decree awarding it, and the parties are not at liberty to contract away
the right of the court in the exercise of its statutory perogative to control and regulate the payment of alimony after judgment of divorce".1
Under these decisions, the wife does not have a vested interest in the
alimony until it is paid over to her and since the alimony that should
be awarded in such cases is a matter which concerns the parties, the
children, and in some degree, the public, these interests would be
placed in constant jeopardy if the wife could, at her pleasure, assign
such decree. It is true in all jurisdictions that the husband can go
into court and upon showing that the amount which he is paying is in
excess of the amount necessary to satisfy the wife's needs, or that the
financial position of the husband has been changed or altered so that
the amount which he is paying is unjust and unreasonable, have the
future installments modified; therefore it seems that this would provide sufficient supervision by the court to protect the interests of
the parties and especially those of the husband.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the courts have reached the
proper result in decreeing that future installments of alimony are nonassignable; the better rule relating to the lump sum award or settlement
would be to permit the wife to make an assignment thereof if she so
desired, and the majority rule, holding that past-due installments can
be assigned, should be followed in all jurisdictions.
. RAmoN A. WooDALL, Ja.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF INSURANCE IN KENTUCKY
Regulation of business by governmental agencies is an accepted
fact in the United States today. Administrative boards, both state and
federal, are at present engaged in the regulation of all sorts and types
of business enterprise. It has long ceased to be a question of whether
there is a right to exercise this form of control; it is rather, how far
may the government go in its regulation, and what form may this
regulation take? There are several factors which have given rise to
this new type of control, namely, the lack of time and technique of
'°Greenburg v. Greenburg, 99 N. J. Eq. 461, 133 Atl. 768 (1926);
Fournier v. Clutton, 146 Mich. 298, 109 N. W. 425 (1906); Welles v.
Brown, 226 Mich. 657, 198 N. W. 180 (1924); Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081,
111 So. 382 (1926).
Supra, n. 20.
22Supra, n. 20.

